mercredi 22 avril 2015

30.4.2015, Πέμπτη, ώρα 7 μμ, Αθήνα, Γαλλική Σχολή, Conférence de l'EFA- E. Kondyli

http://www.efa.gr/index.php/fr/manifestations-scientifiques/nos-manifestations-scientifiques/599-30-04-2015-conference-de-l-efa-e-kondyli

Conférence / Διάλεξη

Jeudi 30 avril
Πέμπτη 30 Απριλίου
19:00 

Salle des conférences de l’EFA / Αίθουσα διαλέξεων της EFA


Οι αραβικές σπουδές στην Ελλάδα
Les études arabes en Grèce
Ελένη Κονδύλη - Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών / Ελληνική Επιστημονική Εταιρεία Σπουδών Μέσης Ανατολής

Conférence en grec - Διάλεξη στα ελληνικά
Στη διάλεξη αυτή, θα δοθεί η ευκαιρία να αναζητήσουμε, αφενός, ποια είναι η θέση της Ελλάδας ως προς τις αραβικές σπουδές, ιστορικά και πολιτιστικά και, αφετέρου, ποιο μπορεί να είναι το περιεχόμενο των αραβικών σπουδών και η οργάνωσή τους μέσα στο χρόνο. θα γίνει προσπάθεια να εντοπίσουμε τα κενά, καθώς και τις πιθανές προτάσεις εξέλιξης των αραβικών σπουδών στον ελληνικό χώρο.

Au cours de cette conférence, l’occasion nous sera donnée d’examiner, d’une part, la position de la Grèce dans le domaine des études arabes, du point de vue historique et culturel et, d’autre part, le contenu et l’organisation de ces études. Nous tenterons de cerner les lacunes, ainsi que les propositions éventuelles de développement des études arabes dans l’espace hellénique. 
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Η Ελένη Κονδύλη γεννήθηκε στην Αθήνα. Σπούδασε ρομανική φιλολογία, ανατολική φιλολογία και ιστορία στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Λουβέν. Η διδακτορική της διατριβή αφορούσε τις σχέσεις βυζαντινής και αραβικής λογοτεχνίας. Εργάστηκε στο Κέντρο Αραβικής Φιλοσοφίας και στο Ινστιτούτο Ανατολικών Σπουδών του Πανεπιστημίου της Λουβέν, στο Εθνικό Κέντρο Επιστημονικής Έρευνας του Βελγίου, καθώς και στο περιοδικό ανατολικών φιλολογιών Le Muséon. Στην Ελλάδα δίδαξε στο Γαλλικό Ινστιτούτο Αθηνών και στη δευτεροβάθμια εκπαίδευση. Σήμερα είναι αναπληρώτρια καθηγήτρια στο Τμήμα Τουρκικών και Σύγχρονων Ασιατικών Σπουδών του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών. Διδάσκει Αραβικό πολιτισμό και Αραβική λογοτεχνία πρωτίστως, τις σχέσεις μεταξύ Γαλλίας και αραβικού κόσμου στον τομέα του πολιτισμού και της λογοτεχνίας, καθώς και τις σχέσεις μεταξύ Βυζαντίου και κόσμου του Ισλάμ.

Είναι συγγραφέας διαφόρων άρθρων και των βιβλίων:
·         Stéphanitès kai Ichnélatès, traduction du Kitab Kalîla wa-Dimna (éditions Peeters, Louvain 1997),
·         Εισαγωγή στη Λογοτεχνία των Αράβων (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2001),
·         Άδωνης. Οι αναλογίες και οι αρχές (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2004) και
·         Αραβικός Πολιτισμός (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2008).

Το 1993 βραβεύτηκε από τη Βασιλική Ακαδημία του Βελγίου, το 2007 έλαβε το Βραβείο Edmond Fagnan για Σημιτικές Σπουδές και το 2008 βραβεύτηκε με Μετάλλιο του Υπουργείου Ανωτάτης Εκπαίδευσης της Αραβικής Δημοκρατίας της Αιγύπτου.
 


Hélène Condylis est née à Athènes. Elle a étudié la philologie romane, ainsi que les philologies et histoire orientales à l’Université de Louvain. Sa thèse de Doctorat portait sur les relations entre les littératures byzantine et arabe. Elle a exercé au Centre de Philosophie Arabe et à l’Institut d’Études Orientales de l’Université de Louvain, ainsi que dans le cadre de la revue de philologie orientale Le Muséon. En Grèce, elle a enseigné à l’Institut Français d’Athènes et dans l’éducation secondaire. Aujourd’hui, elle est professeur au Département d’Études Turques et Asiatiques Contemporaines de l’Université d’Athènes. Elle enseigne principalement la civilisation et la littérature arabes, les relations entre la France et le monde arabe dans les domaines culturel et littéraire, ainsi que les relations entre Byzance et le monde de l’Islam.

Elle est l’auteur de divers articles et des ouvrages suivants : 
·         Stéphanitès kai Ichnélatès, traduction du Kitab Kalîla wa-Dimna (Louvain, éd. Peeters, 1997) ;
·         Εισαγωγή στη Λογοτεχνία των Αράβων (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2001) ; 
·         Άδωνης. Οι αναλογίες και οι αρχές (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2004) ;
·         Αραβικός Πολιτισμός (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2008).

Hélène Condylis est également lauréate de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique (1993), du Prix Edmond Fagnan pour les  Études Sémitiques (2007) et de la Médaille du Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur de la République arabe d’Égypte (2008). 

Applications Now Open For Four Upcoming Middle East Politics Conferences (The Exchange) June-July, 2015 -- Beirut*The Gulf*Tunis*Turkey


The Exchange is an effort by Mideastwire.com and its partners to promote understanding and academic enrichment through a variety of city-focused conferences in and around the Middle East and North Africa.

During their stay, typically lasting from one to two weeks, students and professionals from around the world engage directly with some of the leading intellectuals, academics and political leaders in the country - representing a variety of different viewpoints.

The First Exchange was launched in June 2008 in Beirut, Lebanon. Now, seven years on, almost 400 people from 48 different countries have participated, with many going on to work as diplomats in their home countries, for NGOs serving the region, in universities and as social entrepreneurs.

The following four Exchanges will be offered over the coming months:

* The 4th Gulf Exchange (Dubai, Abu Dhabi & Doha), June 6-June 14
* The 3rd Turkey Exchange (Istanbul & Ankara), June 21-July 4
* The 14th Beirut Exchange (Two Week Program), July 5-July 19
* The 6th Tunis Exchange, July 21-July 31

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To view previous Exchange programs in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Tunis and the Gulf, as well as media coverage of our efforts, visithttp://www.thebeirutexchange.com

View the CNN report on The Beirut Exchange at: http://www.cnn.com/video/#/video/world/2009/01/21/perry.lebanon.meet.hamas.cnn?iref=videosearch

Beirut Exchange Group on Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/groups/10975175535/

Tunis Exchange Group on Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/groups/342217845855326/

Gulf Exchange (previous program with Project Encounter)
https://www.facebook.com/ProjectEncounter

Turkey Exchange: Istanbul & Ankara (Dialogue for Common Future Association)
http://ortakgelecek.org/en/turkey-exchange/

REQUEST AN APPLICATION for any Exchange via info@mideastwire.com

Note that tuition discounts, beyond standard financial aid allocations for those applicants with demonstrated need, are available for alumni of previous Exchange programs as well as students who wish to attend more than one Exchange. For more information, please email info@mideastwire.com

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THE GULF EXCHANGE (Dubai, Abu Dhabi & Doha)
June 6-14, 2015
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Application Deadline I April 15, 2015/Deadline II May 1, 2015
Limited spaces available/Rolling acceptance
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The Gulf Exchange is targeted towards students and professionals who wish to deepen their understanding of the political, economic and social dimensions of the Middle East, and the Gulf in particular.
The 8-day program involves a high-level itinerary in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, consisting of meetings with leading companies, government officials, and civil society representatives. Participants will have closed-door sessions with some of the more high-profile figures in the Gulf, including CEOs, ministers, social leaders, journalists, and others. The integrated itinerary will also include a social and cultural immersion program, with a range of unique experiences organized just for participants of the Gulf Exchange

Speakers at previous Gulf Exchanges have included:

HRH, Dubai's Ruler and UAE's PM, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum
Emirates Airlines Representative Boutrus Boutrus
Social Worker Widad Lootah
Emaar Chairman Mohammed Al-Abbar
Dubai Ports World Chairman Sultan bin Sulayyem
Dubai Multi Commodities Centre Chairman Ahmed bin Sulayyem
Atlantis Hotel Vice President Yahya Idriss
Al Arabiya News Channel Head of News Nakhle El Hajj
Etisalat Spokesperson Ahmed bin Ali
Dubai International Financial Centre
Dubai Police Deputy Chief Commander General Khamis Al-Muzeinah
Dr Abdul Khaliq Abdallah
Sultan Saood Al-Qassimi
Al-Jazeera International

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Costs:

* Total Program Costs - $1800; This includes hotel accommodation (8 nights stay at a four star hotel, shared double room with breakfast), one roundtrip flight to Qatar, as well as all transportation costs associated with the program.

* Airfare - $500, approximate from  the European Union.

REQUEST AN APPLICATION via info@mideastwire.com

Visit our Facebook page and ask alumni questions at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/10975175535/

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THE THIRD TURKEY EXCHANGE (Istanbul & Ankara)
June 21-July 4, 2015
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Application Deadline May 8, 2015
Limited spaces available/Rolling acceptance
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Dialogue for Common Future Association proudly presents its flagship program, the Third Turkey Exchange, in partnership with Mideastwire.com. The aim of the program is to serve as a platform for its participants to observe, study, and analyze the contemporary debates in Turkey through academic, public, and various types of meetings and visits. The program will host around 20 participants from various countries.

The Turkey Exchange rests on two tracks:  

Academic - Participants will attend a series of seminars led by leading Turkish academics, journalists, businesspeople and public intellectuals. Topics will include: The Gezi Protests and social movements, AK Party and Gulen Movement conflict, Turkey and the ISIS crisis, The future of Turkey-EU and Turkey-US relations; Turkey’s role in the Middle East conflicts; Economic reform challenges now and on the horizon; Pipeline politics and Turkey’s energy role; The AK Party in domestic and regional relations; The Kurdish question; Terrorism and the PKK; Turkey’s constitution and justice system; Women in Turkey; Hydro-politics and Turkish foreign policy, among other topics.  

Dialogue with Leaders - Participants will have the opportunity to meet and engage social, political and economic leaders from across the spectrum in Turkey.      

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Speakers at previous Turkey Exchanges have included:
Mustafa Akyol, Star Dailys
Prof. Talip Kucukcan, Foreign Policy Director, SETA
Cengiz Candar, Radikal Daily
Idris Kardas, Platform for Global Challenges
Hugh Pope, Turkey/Cyprus Program Director International Crisis Group
Ceyda Karan, Journalist
Bülent Kenes, PhD, Chief of Editor Today’s Zaman
Prof. Fuat Keyman, Director of Istanbul Policy Center, Sabanci University
Diba Nigar Goksel, Turkish Policy Quarterly
Idris Kardas, General Coordinator Platform for Global Challenges
Prof. Hasan Koni, Istanbul Kultur Univeristy
Oguz Demir, Istanbul Trade University, Economists Platform
Burcu Gultekin Punssman, PhD, Researcher TEPAV
Faik Tunay, Republican People’s Party MP
Oktay Vural, PhD, Vice President of Nationalistic Movement Party Group
Tariq Al Hashimi, Vice President of Iraq
Nuh Yilmaz, PhD, Marmara University, Star Daily
Zeynep Baser, TESEV
Dr. Asaad Asaad, Chairman of Support Center of Psychological and Personal Development of Syrian Refugees in Turkey

Institutions:

Prime Ministry, Office of Public Diplomacy
AK Party Foreign Affairs Presidency
Prime Ministry, Housing Development Administration (TOKI)
Information Technologies and Communication Agency (BTK)
Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA)
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD)
Hrant Dink Foundation
Neve Salom Synagouge
Turkish Radio Television (TRT)
Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul
Religious Affairs Presidency
Greek-Orthodox Patriarchy

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Program Format:
The first nine days of the Exchange will take place at a 4 star hotel in downtown Istanbul (program opens at 6pm on June 21), although there will be several bus trips to meetings arranged outside the conference center. After that, three days of the Exchange will be spent in the capital, Ankara, where a series of meetings with political and diplomatic leaders will be convened. The final day of meetings on July 4 will be held in Istanbul at the hotel (program closes by 6pm on July 4).

Costs:
* Tuition - $2,000; Early Bird Application ($1,750) applies until  March 20, 2015. The last day for applications is May 8, 2015.

* Accommodation - $845; Our group rate is $65 per night, per person for a shared double room in 4 star downtown hotels in Istanbul and Ankara with breakfast and all taxes included. Participants residing in Istanbul have the option of off-site stay during the duration of the program. The hotel will be announced to those participants enrolled in the program.

* Airfare - $400; Approximate from the European Union. First class coach travel to and from Ankara is included in the overall tuition cost.

* Optional Cultural Excursion - $300; Participants will have the option of joining us on a trip to Edirne, the historical capital of the Ottoman Empire before Istanbul, located at the intersection between Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria. The additional cost for the excursion is $300 which includes bus transportation, one hotel night stay and all meals and taxes.

To apply, visit: http://ortakgelecek.org/en/turkey-exchange/

Please address any questions to exchange@ortakgelecek.org

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THE FOURTEENTH BEIRUT EXCHANGE (Two Week Program)
July 5-July 19
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Application Deadline I April 15, 2015/Deadline II May 1, 2015
Limited spaces available/Rolling acceptance
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The two-week Beirut Exchange program rests on two tracks:

Academic - Participants will attend a series of lectures and colloquia led by leading academics and public intellectuals in Lebanon. Topics will include: The Arab Uprisings; The Syrian conflict and its regional implications; The Islamic State; The Special Tribunal for Lebanon; The United Nations as peacekeeper and mediator; Engaging political Islam; Asymmetrical conflict: The July 2006 Lebanon War; Human Rights in Lebanon and the wider Middle East; Sectarianism and its deployment, as well as a range of other topics.

Dialogue with Leaders - Participants will have the opportunity to meet, listen and engage leading social, political and economic actors from across the spectrum in Lebanon.

NOTE: Due to the current security situation in Lebanon, the Fourteenth Beirut Exchange will generally restrict its meetings in and around Beirut, although at least one trip to the North and one trip to the South is planned.

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View a previous full program for the Beirut Exchange at: http://www.thebeirutexchange.com/images/stories/products/1_-_ScheduleJan2012.pdf

Monday, January 5
9am – Nicholas Noe, Mideastwire.com
1:30 – Ayman Mhanna, Samir Kassir Foundation
4pm – Omar Nashabe, Consultant for the Defense Counsel at the STL
7pm – Jihad Yazigi, The Syria Report

Tuesday, January 6
9:30am – Karim Makdisi, American University of Beirut
1:30pm – Discussion section
3:30pm – Bashir Saade, Edinburgh University
6pm – Anne Barnard, New York Times
8pm – Nicolas Pouillard, Institut Français du Proche-Orient

Wednesday, January 7
10am – Discussion section
12:30pm – Shadi Karam, Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister
2:15pm – Nick Blanford, Times of London/Daily Star
4pm – Ibrahim Moussawi, Al-Manar TV
5:30 – Liz Sly, Washignton Post

Thursday, January 8
9am – Alice Arrue, UNIFIL
10:30am – Angelina Eichhorst, EU Delegation to the Lebanese Republic
11:30am – Ahmed Fatfat, Future Movement
1:30pm – The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Staff
7pm – Abdullah Dardari, United Nations

Friday, January 9
9am – Makram Rabah, Georgetown University
11:30pm – Zizette Darkazally, UNRWA
4:30pm – Sami Gemayel, Kataeb
7pm – Mohammad Obeid, Hizbullah

Saturday, January 10
10:30am – Vincent Battle, Former US Ambassador
12pm – Ali Hamdan, AMAL
4pm – Mustapha Alloush, Future Movement

Sunday, January 11
1:30pm– Trip to the South (“Resistance Museum at Mleeta,” weather permitting)
5pm – Walid Jumblatt, Progressive Socialist Party

Monday, January 12
10am – Rabih Shibley, AUB
1pm – Alain Aoun, Free Patriotic Movement
2pm – Antoine Zahra, Lebanese Forces
3:30pm – Eli Khoury, Saatchi & Saatchi/Quantum
5pm – Hanin Ghaddar, Now Lebanon
8:30 – Dinner @ Muzzienne Restaurant

Tuesday, January 13
9:30am – Ali Qanso, Lebanese Armed Forces General Directorate
11:30am – Mohammad Afif, Hizbullah
1pm – Nadim Houri, Human Rights Watch
2:30pm – May Akl, Free Patriotic Movement
4:30pm – Becharra Rai, Patriarch of the Maronite Church
7pm – Nadim Gemayel, Kateab

Wednesday, January 14
10am – Ali Fayyad, Hizbullah
11:30am – Mohammad Qabbani, Former Sunni Mufti of Lebanon

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Costs:

Tuition - $1800; Partial financial aid is available for those students and individuals that can demonstrate need.

Accommodation - $840; Except for those students already residing in Lebanon, we recommend that all participants in the Exchange reside at the conference hotel during the duration of the ten day program. The hotel, located near Downtown Beirut, is priced at $60 per person/per night, including all taxes and breakfast, for a shared double room (we will arrange for sharing). Single rooms are available for $110 per night. Note that we will also arrange for less expensive, private housing near to the conference room which will be priced at approximately $40 per person, per night.

Airfare - $400, approximate from the European Union.

At the discretion of the student, tuition is 50% refundable up to three weeks before the program commences. (Airline tickets and accommodation should be purchased with travel insurance.)

REQUEST AN APPLICATION via info@mideastwire.com

Visit our Facebook page and ask alumni questions at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/10975175535/

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THE SIXTH TUNIS EXCHANGEJuly 21-July 31, 2015
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Application Deadline I April 15, 2015/Deadline II May 1, 2015
Limited spaces available/Rolling acceptance
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As with our other Exchanges, the ten-day program will engage students from around the world in a multifaceted discussion of some of the key issues facing Tunisia and the wider region. The Tunis Exchange program specifically rests on two tracks this Summer.

Track 1: Academic Seminars. Participants will attend a series of lectures with leading academics and public intellectuals in Tunisia. Topics will include, among others:

- The history and internal transformations of Ennahda, including organizational and ideological evolution since the revolution;

- The post-revolutionary evolution of the UGTT, Tunisia's powerful labor union, and its role in politics (including implications of its role as primary mediator in the National Dialogue of late 2013);

- Composition, platforms of, and alliances between major parties (including Jebha Chaabia, Nidaa Tounes, Hizb Joumhouri, and Afeq Tounes) with a view toward the next elections;

- State of the Tunisian economy, including regional inequalities, budget transparency and decentralization, etc.;

- Institutional and legislative reform needs following the passage of Tunisia's constitution, focusing particularly on reform of the Ministry of Interior (security sector) and Ministry of Justice (judicial sector), Tunisia's two most problematic ministries;

- Human rights in the new Tunisia (addressing issues such as freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, status of women, use of torture and the terrorism debate);

- Salafism, its composition (political, quietist, jihadi) in Tunisia and its relationship to and implications for party politics, stability, and governance moving forward;

- Taking stock of what Tunisia has done regarding transitional justice, what steps are planned to realize the recently passed transitional justice law, and what more needs to be done;

- The role of the media and civil society organizations;

- Youth politics and activism within and outside formal party structure.


Track 2: Dialogue with Leaders. Participants will have the opportunity to meet, listen and engage leading social, political, religious and economic leaders from across the spectrum in Tunisia.

Speakers at the five previous Tunis Exchanges have included:
Abdelfattah Morou (Ennahda Party)
Rached Ghannouchi (Ennahda Party)
Mehrezia Laabidi (Ennahda Party)
Imed Dehmi (President, Congress for the Republic Party)
Taieb Bakkouche (Secretary General, Nidaa Tounes)
Lazhar Akremi, (Nidaa Tounes)
Hama Hammami (Popular Front)
Meriem Bourbuiba (Former Hizb Joumhouri)
Maya Jribi (Hizb Joumhouri)
Adnen Haji (UGTT, Leader of the 2008 uprising in Redeyef)
Mounir Ajroud (President, Leagues to Protect the Revolution)
Mohamed Belkhouja (President, Reform Front/Salafist Party)
Habib Kazdaghli (Manouba University)
Taieb Ghozi (Imam, Grand Mosque of Kairouan)
Michael Ayari (International Crisis Group)
Ahlem Belhaj (President, Tunisian Association of Democratic Women)
Kamel Laabidi (National Authority for Information and Communication Reform)
Amna Guellali (Director, Human Rights Watch)
Bochra Belhaj Hamidi (Lawyer)
Hamida Ennaifer (Co-founder, Islamic Tendency Movement)
Salaheddine Jourchi (Co-founder, Islamic Tendency Movement)
Youssef Seddik (Philosopher)
Fabio Merone (Researcher, Gerda Hinkel Foundation)
Radwan Masmoudi (Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy)
Amira Yahyaoui (Al-Bawsala)
Sihem Ben Sedrine (Transitional Justice Commission)
Slim Amamou (Blogger, Former Minister)
Yassine Ayari (Blogger, leading figure in the revolution)

Institutions:

UGTT (Tunisian General Labour Union)
Jibha Chaabia (Popular Front)
Ennahda Party
Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia)
Congress for the Republic (CPR)
Leagues to Protect the Revolution
Jibhat al-Islah (a leading Salafist party)
Ettakatol Party
Afeq Tounes Party
Hizb Joumhouri Party (formerly PDP)
Union of Tunisian Journalists
Committee to Protect Journalists
High Authority for Audio-Visual Communication (HAICA)
Nessma TV
Kalimat Radio
Nawaat
Ettounsia Newspaper
Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (Les Femmes Democrates)
Ministry of Women's Affairs
Human Rights Watch, Tunisia
Ministry of Transitional Justice and Human Rights
Tunisian Observatory for a Democratic Transition
Al-Bawsala (government monitoring NGO)
Tunisian League of Human Rights (LTDH)
Amnesty International, Tunisia
Tunisian Network for Social Economy
Tunisian-American Chamber of Commerce
Tunisian Association of Young Entrepreneurs
Governorates (meeting with governors of Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa and Sfax)
Manouba University
Tunis University
Ministry of Religious Affairs
Ministry of Finance
International Center for Transitional Justice
Tunisian Judges Association
Tunisian Lawyers Association

(To view previous schedules for the Tunis Exchanges, visit www.thebeirutexchange.com)
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Program Format:
The Tunis Exchange will be held over ten days, mainly at the conference room of The El-Hana International hotel in downtown Tunis. It is recommended that students stay at the hotel since most meetings will take place in the hotel conference room. Off-site meetings during the ten days will entail bus travel as a group in and around Tunis, including to the National Assembly. At least three days of the program will entail travel to other cities and regions in Tunisia for meetings with local activists, intellectuals, academics and political/religious leaders, including in Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa, Redeyef and Sfax.

Costs:
Tuition - $1300; Partial financial aid is available for those students and individuals that can demonstrate need as well as alumni of our previous programs. All bus travel, transportation from the airport on arrival and other program costs associated with the full 10-day Exchange are included.

Accommodation - $500; Eight nights of the program will be spent in Tunis, while at least two nights will be spent at hotels outside of Tunis. Room rates vary depending on arrangements, but generally fall within the range of $50 per night, per student for a shared double room (breakfast and taxes are included). Alternative accommodation, including in a single room, is available upon request.

Airfare - $350, approximate from the European Union.

REQUEST AN APPLICATION via info@mideastwire.com

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About The Exchange Co-Directors:

Baybars Orsek (Istanbul-Ankara) holds his bachelors degree in international relations from Istanbul Bilgi University and obtained a masters degree in conflict analysis and resolution from Sabanci University. Mr. Orsek is currently pursuing his PhD in Political Science at Yeditepe University. Between 2012-2013, Orsek worked with the Platform for Global Challenges as the Organizational Coordinator where he coordinated many events dealing with international issues. He is also the founder of the consulting firm Istanbul Solution Center and is currently Chairman of the Board of Directors at The Dialogue for Common Future Association.

Monica L. Marks (Istanbul-Ankara & Tunis) is a North Africa analyst, Rhodes Scholar, and visiting fellow at Columbia University's Center for the Study of Democracy, Toleration, and Religion. Her work, which focuses primarily on Islamism and institutional reform in Tunisia, has appeared in numerous peer-reviewed academic publications and news outlets including The Guardian, The New York Times, Foreign Policy as well as think tanks such as the Barcelona-based Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT), the Carnegie Endowment, and the Brookings Doha Center. A former Fulbright Scholar to Turkey, Ms. Marks returned there to work as an instructor at Istanbul's Bogazici University in 2013 and again in 2014. Ms. Marks is based, however, in Tunisia, where she has also moonlighted as a freelance journalist for The New York Times and she frequently comments as a Tunisia-based political analyst on programs including BBC, France 24, and NPR. Ms. Marks is a doctoral candidate at St Antony's College Oxford. Her doctoral research is supported by the European Research Council in conjunction with the Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman (IREMEM) in Aix-en-Provence.

Ferdi Ferhat Ozsoy (Istanbul-Ankara) received his undergraduate diploma from City University of New York at Brooklyn College where he triple majored in History, Political Science and Education. He is currently completing his MA on International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University and is working at the Platform for Global Challenges at Istanbul Bilgi University as an Organization Coordinator, organizing seminars, conferences and panels on foreign affairs. Mr. Ozsoy is one of the founding members of the Dialogue for Common Future Association and serves as the Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors.

Nicholas Noe (Istanbul-Ankara, Gulf, Tunis & Beirut) is currently a co-editor of the Heinrich Boell Foundation's journal on the Middle East, Perspectives, the editor of the 2007 book, "Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah" (Verso), Co-Founder & Editor-in-Chief of the Beirut-based news translation service Mideastwire.com covering the Middle East media and the Co-Director of The Exchange program which now counts almost 400 student alumni from 48 different countries. He regularly provides commentary for Al-Jazeera International, BBC, CNN and several US and European publications and is the author of a White Paper for the Century Foundation entitled: "Re-Imagining the Lebanon Track: Towards a New US Policy." Mr. Noe's op-eds on the region have appeared in The New York Times, The Guardian, Foreign Policy Magazine, Asia Times, The National and The National Interest.

Yamen Soukkarieh (Istanbul-Ankara, Gulf, Tunis & Beirut) is the Co-Director of the Beirut Exchange program. Since graduating in 1999 with a Communication Media Degree from the Lebanese American University in Beirut, he has worked as a producer and cameraman for numerous Lebanese and international films, media productions, documentaries and journalists including CNN, Arte and Al Jazeera among others.

Leila Hatoum (Gulf & Beirut) is a media professional with 15 years experience in the field who has worked with prestigious local, regional and international media outlets including Al Arabiya News Channel, The Wall Street Journal,  CBS TV  and The Daily Star. Ms. Hatoum has also worked for the United Nation's UNOCHA and UNIFIL. She is a Co-Founding Partner of Mideastwire.com and a Co-Director of The Exchange program and holds a masters degree in international public law with an emphasis on humanitarian law.

lundi 20 avril 2015

30.4.2015, Οι αραβικές σπουδές στην Ελλάδα

http://www.efa.gr/index.php/fr/manifestations-scientifiques/nos-manifestations-scientifiques/599-30-04-2015-conference-de-l-efa-e-kondyli

Conférence / Διάλεξη

Jeudi 30 avril
Πέμπτη 30 Απριλίου
19:00 

Salle des conférences de l’EFA / Αίθουσα διαλέξεων της EFA


Οι αραβικές σπουδές στην Ελλάδα
Les études arabes en Grèce

Ελένη Κονδύλη - Πανεπιστήμιο Αθηνών / Ελληνική Επιστημονική Εταιρεία Σπουδών Μέσης Ανατολής

Conférence en grec - Διάλεξη στα ελληνικά

Στη διάλεξη αυτή, θα δοθεί η ευκαιρία να αναζητήσουμε, αφενός, ποια είναι η θέση της Ελλάδας ως προς τις αραβικές σπουδές, ιστορικά και πολιτιστικά και, αφετέρου, ποιο μπορεί να είναι το περιεχόμενο των αραβικών σπουδών και η οργάνωσή τους μέσα στο χρόνο. θα γίνει προσπάθεια να εντοπίσουμε τα κενά, καθώς και τις πιθανές προτάσεις εξέλιξης των αραβικών σπουδών στον ελληνικό χώρο.

Au cours de cette conférence, l’occasion nous sera donnée d’examiner, d’une part, la position de la Grèce dans le domaine des études arabes, du point de vue historique et culturel et, d’autre part, le contenu et l’organisation de ces études. Nous tenterons de cerner les lacunes, ainsi que les propositions éventuelles de développement des études arabes dans l’espace hellénique. 

*******

Η Ελένη Κονδύλη γεννήθηκε στην Αθήνα. Σπούδασε ρομανική φιλολογία, ανατολική φιλολογία και ιστορία στο Πανεπιστήμιο της Λουβέν. Η διδακτορική της διατριβή αφορούσε τις σχέσεις βυζαντινής και αραβικής λογοτεχνίας. Εργάστηκε στο Κέντρο Αραβικής Φιλοσοφίας και στο Ινστιτούτο Ανατολικών Σπουδών του Πανεπιστημίου της Λουβέν, στο Εθνικό Κέντρο Επιστημονικής Έρευνας του Βελγίου, καθώς και στο περιοδικό ανατολικών φιλολογιών Le Muséon. Στην Ελλάδα δίδαξε στο Γαλλικό Ινστιτούτο Αθηνών και στη δευτεροβάθμια εκπαίδευση. Σήμερα είναι αναπληρώτρια καθηγήτρια στο Τμήμα Τουρκικών και Σύγχρονων Ασιατικών Σπουδών του Εθνικού και Καποδιστριακού Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών. Διδάσκει Αραβικό πολιτισμό και Αραβική λογοτεχνία πρωτίστως, τις σχέσεις μεταξύ Γαλλίας και αραβικού κόσμου στον τομέα του πολιτισμού και της λογοτεχνίας, καθώς και τις σχέσεις μεταξύ Βυζαντίου και κόσμου του Ισλάμ.

Είναι συγγραφέας διαφόρων άρθρων και των βιβλίων:
·         Stéphanitès kai Ichnélatès, traduction du Kitab Kalîla wa-Dimna (éditions Peeters, Louvain 1997),
·         Εισαγωγή στη Λογοτεχνία των Αράβων (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2001),
·         Άδωνης. Οι αναλογίες και οι αρχές (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2004) και
·         Αραβικός Πολιτισμός (Ελληνικά Γράμματα, 2008).

Το 1993 βραβεύτηκε από τη Βασιλική Ακαδημία του Βελγίου, το 2007 έλαβε το Βραβείο Edmond Fagnan για Σημιτικές Σπουδές και το 2008 βραβεύτηκε με Μετάλλιο του Υπουργείου Ανωτάτης Εκπαίδευσης της Αραβικής Δημοκρατίας της Αιγύπτου.
 


Hélène Condylis est née à Athènes. Elle a étudié la philologie romane, ainsi que les philologies et histoire orientales à l’Université de Louvain. Sa thèse de Doctorat portait sur les relations entre les littératures byzantine et arabe. Elle a exercé au Centre de Philosophie Arabe et à l’Institut d’Études Orientales de l’Université de Louvain, ainsi que dans le cadre de la revue de philologie orientale Le Muséon. En Grèce, elle a enseigné à l’Institut Français d’Athènes et dans l’éducation secondaire. Aujourd’hui, elle est professeur au Département d’Études Turques et Asiatiques Contemporaines de l’Université d’Athènes. Elle enseigne principalement la civilisation et la littérature arabes, les relations entre la France et le monde arabe dans les domaines culturel et littéraire, ainsi que les relations entre Byzance et le monde de l’Islam.

Elle est l’auteur de divers articles et des ouvrages suivants : 
·         Stéphanitès kai Ichnélatès, traduction du Kitab Kalîla wa-Dimna (Louvain, éd. Peeters, 1997) ;
·         Εισαγωγή στη Λογοτεχνία των Αράβων (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2001) ; 
·         Άδωνης. Οι αναλογίες και οι αρχές (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2004) ;
·         Αραβικός Πολιτισμός (Athènes, Ellinika Grammata, 2008).

Hélène Condylis est également lauréate de l’Académie Royale des Sciences, des Lettres et des Beaux-Arts de Belgique (1993), du Prix Edmond Fagnan pour les  Études Sémitiques (2007) et de la Médaille du Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur de la République arabe d’Égypte (2008). 

vendredi 17 avril 2015

Call for Papers for open panels during the international DAVO Congress in Bochum, 24-27 September 2015


 You are kindly invited to send paper proposals until 8 June 2015 to the chair persons of the open panels of the  "22nd International Congress of the German Middle East Studies Association (DAVO)"

The titles of the open panels are shown in the text below and the detailed descriptions of the panels are attached. Further panel proposals are welcome.

1) Implementing National Spatial and Urban Policies
    Chair: Dr. Sebastian Elbe and Dr. Katrin Bäumer (Darmstadt)

2) The Economic Development Perspective of the Arab States after the „Spring“
    Chair: Salam Said (Erlangen/Bremen)

3) Urban Governance, Housing Policies and Livelihoods in Arab Cities: Revolutionary Times?
    Chair: Maike Didero (Aachen)

4)  Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey? – History, Politics, Society
     Chair: Prof. Dr. Lutz Berger (Kiel)

5)  Sexuality and Marriage in Islamic Communities
     Chair: Thomas Gugler (Münster) and Johannes Rosenbaum (Bamberg)

6) Rethinking Middle Eastern Studies Post-Arab Revolts
    Chair: Ali Fathollah-Nejad (London/Brussels)

7) Towards Critical Iranian Studies: New Perspectives on Post-Revolutionary Iran
    Chair: Ali Fathollah-Nejad (London/Brussels)

8) Four Years After: The Post-Arab Spring Era and its Multifarious Challenges for the European Union
    Chair: Prof. Dr. Annette Jünemann and Julia Simon M.A. (Hamburg)

9) Multiple Forms of Political and Cultural Expression: Youth Cultures in the Arab Gulf States
    Chair: Menno Preuschaft (Münster)

10) Beyond Orient and Occident: Israel’s Cultural Location in the Middle East     Chair: Shelley Harten (Berlin) and Johannes Becke (Heidelberg)

11) Salafism –  An Islamic Fundamentalist Movement in the National and International Spotlight
      Chair: Thorsten Gerald Schneiders (Duisburg) and Dr. Jörn Thielmann (Erlangen)

12) Islamophobia as Research Assignment for Islamic Science
     Chair: Thorsten Gerald Schneiders (Duisburg)

Please note the following deadlines:

- Until 15 May 2015: Further abstracts of proposals for open panels for which papers are invited. These proposals will be forwarded to more than 5500 scholars. Send your proposal (abstract maximum 200 words) to the General Secretary of conference Amke Dietert congress@davo-iswidmg2015.de.

- Until 15 June 2015: Proposals for closed panels, papers and posters (abstract up to 200 words).

- Until 15 July 2015: Information about the approval or rejection of the proposals.

- Until 31 July 2015: Registration of participation in the conference at a reduced fee.

- After 31 July 2015: Registration of participation in the conference at an increased fee.

- 24 September 2015: General Meeting of the members of DAVO and the Section Conference of the Islamic Studies Section of the DMG.

Additional information at http://davo-iswidmg2015.de/en/

Best regards,

Guenter Meyer

-----------------------------------
Prof. Dr. Guenter Meyer
Director of the Centre for Research on the Arab World (CERAW),
University of Mainz
55099 Mainz - Germany
Ph. ++49 - 6131 - 39 22701
Fax ++49 - 6131 - 39 24736
E-mail: g.meyer@geo.uni-mainz.de
Chairman of DAVO: www.davo1.de
Press articles: www.facebook.com/CERAW.Info

jeudi 16 avril 2015

κινηματογράφος και Μαγρέμπ

10E ÉDITION DU PANORAMA DU MAGHREB ET DU MOYEN-ORIENT, DU 31 MARS AU 19 AVRIL 2015 
ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 07/04/2015

Par Mathilde Rouxel

La 10e édition du Panorama du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient se tient du 31 mars au 19 avril 2015 dans les salles du cinéma Écran de Saint-Denis, de l’Entrepôt de Paris, du Louxor-Palais du cinéma, à l’Espace 1789 de Saint Ouen, du cinéma l’Étoile de la Courneuve, du cinéma le Trianon de Romainville, du cinéma Louis Daquin de Saint Denis, du cinéma Le Studio d’Aubervilliers, de l’Institut des Cultures d’Islam et à l’Institut du Monde Arabe.
Le Panorama des Cinémas du Maghreb et du Moyen-Orient est un festival de films implanté en Île-de-France depuis 2006. Soutenu par la ville de Saint-Denis, il est l’occasion de nombreuses rencontres, réflexions et débats autour des problématiques qui sous-tendent ces productions culturelles arabes et orientales qui se déroulent sur une quinzaine de jours. Outre les cinémas (Ecran de Saint-Denis, Entrepôt à Paris), le festival, organisé par l’association Indigènes Films, investit les écoles, l’université, les médiathèques de quartier.
L’initiative est née en 2006 pour promouvoir et diffuser le cinéma marocain. Dès 2008, ses frontières se sont ouvertes aux cinémas du Maghreb, pour s’intéresser au Moyen-Orient (en tant qu’aire culturelle qui intègre les civilisations arabes, perses et turques) à partir de 2012. 
Ce festival, aujourd’hui bien ancré dans la scène culturelle de la région parisienne, offre à cette cinématographie émergente et encore peu diffusée sur le territoire français une visibilité et un contact intéressants avec de nouveaux publics. Cette ouverture à la cinématographie maghrébine et moyen-orientale est un outil privilégié pour combattre les clichés parfois véhiculés sur la culture musulmane.
Le PCMMO a par ailleurs su tisser des liens privilégiés avec des festivals arabes de renommée internationale, à l’image des festivals de Dubaï, Rabat ou Doha. 
L’intérêt particulier de ce festival réside dans son choix de ne pas se consacrer exclusivement aux films issus d’Algérie, de Tunisie, de Palestine, du Liban, d’Égypte, de Syrie, d’Iran ou de Turquie, mais de les mettre en regard du cinéma produit par les diasporas dans le monde. Ce large éventail permet de présenter des cinématographies et, à travers elles, des cultures complexes qui ouvrent un espace de réflexion et de partage.
Cette année, le festival propose un « focus Maroc contemporain ». Le Maroc est un pays où la production cinématographique est aujourd’hui en plein essor. Avec comme invité d’honneur le directeur du Centre cinématographique marocain Sarim Fassi-Fihri, et la présence de nombreux réalisateurs, le Panorama propose une programmation de dix films contemporains de fiction et de documentaire, où Réveil de Mohamed Zineddaine côtoieMille mois de Fnouzi Bonsaid ou Les Chevaux de Dieu de Nabil Ayouch. L’affaire Ben Barka bénéficie par ailleurs d’une attention particulière.
Le festival offre par ailleurs une carte blanche à la Cinémathèque de Tanger, et avec elle l’occasion pour le public parisien de découvrir le patrimoine audiovisuel culturel et historique du monde arabe conservé par cette association installée à Tanger, au Maroc. Née en 2006, celle-ci a déjà réuni d’importants fonds documentaires, de vidéos, de films de fiction, principalement issus du Maroc ou du monde arabe, pour contrebalancer « l’hégémonie des films commerciaux » [1]. L’intervention au PCMMO de Malika Chaghal, déléguée générale de la Cinémathèque de Tanger, permet d’ouvrir le dialogue sur la diffusion des cinématographies du Sud et de questionner la préservation et la conservation des archives d’images animées au Maghreb et au Moyen-Orient : il s’agit en effet d’une aire géographique où les cinémathèques se font rares.
Outre le Maroc, le festival propose une sélection de trente-quatre films de fiction, documentaires, longs et courts-métrages. Les Terrasses de Merzak Allouache (Algérie) donne à voir la foule chaotique qui s’affaire dans les rues d’Alger ; Villa Touma de Suha Arraf (Palestine) pointe sa caméra sur les tourments de trois chrétiennes de Ramallah ;Home sweet home de Nadine Naous (Liban) nous présente les difficultés politiques qui transforment sans cesse Beyrouth ; Je suis le peuple d’Anna Roussillon (France) donne la parole à la population de Haute-Égypte, qui exprime son opinion et ses espoirs suite à la révolution qui a secoué la place Tahrir du Caire. Une sélection de courts-métrages sera également présentée. Toutes les projections sont suivies d’un débat.
Pour réfléchir au-delà des projections, des tables rondes et des rencontres professionnelles sont organisées, au cinéma Écran de Saint-Denis les deux premières semaines, puis à l’Institut du Monde Arabe. Sont ainsi interrogées la diffusion des cinématographies du sud, à partir de la question de savoir quels circuits de distribution festivals et salles sont ouverts à ce type de production, les représentations des musulmans dans la société, les opportunités qui se présentent aux jeunes réalisateurs du Maghreb pour la réalisation d’un court-métrage ou encore le problème de la liberté de création cinématographique à travers le monde.
Site du festival : 
http://www.pcmmo.org/

WWW.LESCLESDUMOYENORIENT.COM/CALIFAT- κ.λπ.

http://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/Califat-et-legitimite-du-pouvoir.html

CALIFAT ET LÉGITIMITÉ DU POUVOIR DANS LE SUNNISME 
ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 09/04/2015

Par Inès Aït Mokhtar

La question du califat traverse l’histoire de la pensée musulmane, et occupe une place centrale dans les débats effectifs autour de l’organisation du pouvoir. Disparue en 1924 au terme d’une histoire longue et riche de mutations, cette institution connaît aujourd’hui un regain d’intérêt chez les chercheurs, dans la mesure où elle est proclamée comme source de légitimité du pouvoir par ceux qui contrôlent aujourd’hui certaines régions d’Irak et de Syrie, regroupées sous le terme « Etat islamique ». La notion d’Etat est pourtant le résultat de constructions théoriques et politiques relativement récentes, advenues essentiellement en Occident, à l’âge moderne. Son emploi à l’endroit de cette nouveauté théologico-politique dont il est difficile de cerner les contours peut donc surprendre, et il nous invite à nous pencher davantage sur les structures politiques dont elle se réclame afin d’asseoir sa légitimité. Or, celles-ci semblent converger vers le califat comme institution et source de tout pouvoir légitime.
C’est à travers ce prisme qu’il nous faut ici étudier la notion de califat, afin de compléter une approche historique nécessaire par une approche plus théorique qui doit nous permettre de saisir la portée conceptuelle et la signification du califat en tant qu’il est un outil de pouvoir. Pour ce faire, les analyses d’André Miquel sont particulièrement intéressantes, et c’est d’elles que nous nous inspirons ici.

Aux origines du califat : un pouvoir laissé vacant

Comme d’autres articles l’ont ici montré, le califat naît dans des circonstances particulières, celles d’une indécision quant à la façon dont il s’agit de désigner le guide de la communauté après la mort du prophète. Il lui faut trouver un « successeur » et c’est précisément ce qu’est le calife. Le mot arabe khalifa signifie littéralement « successeur », et la légitimité de celui-ci tient à sa proximité avec le prophète, de son vivant. Cependant, des querelles de succession existent dès les origines, et il n’est pas exagéré d’affirmer que c’est elles qui conduiront en partie à la scission qui opposera bientôt le shiisme au sunnisme, comme en témoigne l’épisode historique de la « Grande Discorde ».
C’est donc afin de résoudre un problème politique très concret, celui de la vacance du pouvoir laissé par la mort du prophète, que nait l’institution califale en tant que telle, qui peut être nommée l’institution de la succession. Or, qui dit succession dit possession du pouvoir, et cette question conduit nécessairement à celle de la légitimité d’un tel pouvoir. C’est en effet une constante de toute pensée politique, que celle-ci soit fondée sur des motifs théologiques ou non, que de penser conjointement le pouvoir et sa légitimité. Or, cette légitimité sera ici pensée en regard de la Révélation : la Révélation est-elle close une fois la vie du prophète achevée ou bien continue-t-elle de se déployer à travers l’exemple offert par la vie de sa descendance, celle d’Ali et de Fatima ? Si le shiisme penche pour le second pan de l’alternative, c’est plutôt le premier qui a la faveur du sunnisme, et il nous faut voir comment la clôture de la Révélation rend problématique la légitimité du pouvoir.

Le califat : le pouvoir et la Loi

Si la question de la Loi est ici cruciale, c’est parce que c’est en regard de celle-ci que se pose un double problème, qui permet de comprendre la nécessité du califat : celui de la connaissance de la Loi d’une part, et celui de son exécution d’autre part.
Le premier problème est celui de la tradition et de la nouveauté. En effet, à mesure que la communauté grandit, elle ne se réduit plus au petit groupe qui constituait la communauté des origines, et, de ce fait, elle voit émerger en son sein des situations ou configurations sociales qui n’auraient pas pu exister alors qu’elle était restreinte. Des incohérences naissent alors entre la lettre de la Loi et le tissu social effectif. L’immensité de la communauté rend, de plus, impossible toute décision à l’unanimité (ijma) préconisée dans de tels cas. De ce fait, la seule solution est d’en référer à une autorité supérieure telle que le calife.
Le second problème, celui de l’exécution de la Loi, se réduit à celui de la figure qui exécute la Loi, et donc à la figure du pouvoir elle-même, qui est celle du calife. Or, dans le sunnisme, le choix d’un chef unique dont le pouvoir suprême est institué et reconnu par la communauté est un devoir de la communauté elle-même. Au fondement du pouvoir ainsi, se trouve la Loi, dans la mesure où c’est la nécessité de maintenir et d’exécuter la Loi révélée qui implique l’existence d’un calife. En ce sens, le rôle du calife, en tant que successeur du prophète et gouvernant de Dieu, est de faire respecter une Loi qui n’a précisément pas été édictée ni reçue par lui.
C’est ce rôle de garant de la Loi révélée qui justifie idéalement l’existence du califat, et ainsi, du calife. Toutefois, les modalités de désignation du calife ne sont fixées nulle part, et soulèvent des enjeux redoutables.

Les sources du pouvoir : l’élection du calife

Les théories sunnites répondent au problème de la désignation par l’élection, qui est la seule modalité de choix valide, et par laquelle il s’agit de désigner un chef « apte » et « digne » parmi ceux qui descendent de la famille du prophète, les Quraysh. Dans les faits, pourtant, le principe de cette élection va être maintenu au prix d’une torsion de la réalité afin de la faire correspondre à la théorie, qui va finalement reconnaître la légitimité d’un électeur unique. En effet, bien que le califat soit la chose de la communauté entière, il est plus aisé de réduire le nombre des électeurs, au point que ces derniers se réduiront sans cesse jusqu’à ce que le souverain calife lui-même désigne son propre successeur, se faisant ainsi électeur unique.
Cet appel à la notion d’électeur unique était nécessaire pour maintenant la cohésion de la communauté, même si elle se résume dans les faits à une désignation de son successeur par le calife lui-même, de façon indépendante de la communauté. Pourtant, si cette théorie demeure légitime, c’est parce que, à travers le calife, c’est la Loi révélée qui parle, dont le calife n’est que le garant et le représentant.

L’idéalisme des théories autour du califat

La question du califat, en plus des modalités de son institution, pose la question de son application possible à la réalité, comme toute construction théorique idéale. 
Cette tension entre idéal et réalité est constitutive du califat depuis ses origines, et permet à ce titre de souligner combien un appel à la restitution du califat en des situations socio-historiques hétérogènes pose problème depuis toujours. Ainsi, le califat est un idéal, celui des origines et des débuts effectifs de l’Islam. Or, André Miquel souligne combien cette institution a rencontré des tourments, et n’a jamais cédé dans la théorie et en droit, malgré l’institution du principe dynastique ou de l’hégémonie turque, qui l’ont contredit dans les faits [1].
C’est ainsi que la théorie du califat se caractérise par un double idéal, celui d’un pouvoir unique et d’un pouvoir légitime, c’est-à-dire légitime en regard de la Révélation. C’est la raison pour laquelle André Miquel considère que le califat et ses défenseurs procèdent d’un « idéalisme foncier » [2], et c’est peut-être justement ce caractère idéaliste qui nous le rend si difficile à comprendre.

Conclusion

La question de la légitimité du califat, si elle traverse l’histoire du monde arabo-musulman, est avant tout une question de théorie politique, celle de la légitimité d’un pouvoir qui se réclame d’une source divine. C’est ainsi la Loi Révélée qui en fonde la légitimité et l’unique horizon. Plutôt que de se fondre dans la réalité, c’est à la réalité de se tordre face à la puissance de la Révélation, et c’est précisément ce qui rend cette institution inaudible à des oreilles sécularisées.
De ce fait, le rétablissement actuel du califat dans certaines zones de Syrie et d’Irak pose bien entendu des problèmes économiques et géopolitiques centraux, mais il trouble avant tout nos catégories de compréhension des évolutions politiques, desquelles la transcendance religieuse est absente. C’est précisément parce que la restauration du califat correspond à une restauration de la transcendance religieuse dans les processus de légitimation du pouvoir qu’elle nous est si difficile à saisir.
A LIRE SUR LES CLES DU MOYEN-ORIENT :
Bibliographie
- André Miquel, « Autour du Califat et de la notion de légitimité », in. Tiers-Monde, 1982.
- André Miquel, L’islam et sa civilisation (VIIe – XXe siècle), 1968.
[1A. Miquel, « Autour du Califat et de la notion de légitimité », in. Tiers-Monde, 1982.
[2Ibid.

INTERVIEW WITH HAZEM KANDIL – INSIDE THE BROTHERHOOD (PART ONE) 
ARTICLE PUBLIÉ LE 08/04/2015

By Margot Dazey in Cambridge, UK
Hazem Kandil is the Cambridge University Lecturer in Political Sociology and Fellow of St Catharine’s College. He studies power relations in revolution and war, focusing on the Middle East, Western Europe, and North America.
Following an MA (2004) in International Relations from the American University in Cairo, and an MA (2005) in Political Theory from New York University, he received his PhD (2012) in Political Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles.
He is the author of Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen : Egypt’s Road to Revolt (Verso 2012), Inside the Brotherhood (Polity 2014), and The Power Triangle : Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
He has published articles on revolution, warfare, and ideology in various academic journals and periodicals.
Hazem Kandil received the 2014 Philip Leverhulme Prize, which funds his current projects on the development of the US war doctrine, and the relationship between conscription and democracy in France and Egypt.

Can you sketch an overview of the Muslim Brothers’ creation and expansion and reflect on the concept of “counter-hegemony” that you are applying to the Brotherhood’s history [1] ?

The historical section in my book [2] goes back to the end of the 19th century, since it was characterized by a certain intellectual crisis that still resonates today. Even though Muslims occasionally faced times of weakness, they did not question the cultural and legal foundations of their community. But major changes occurred throughout the 19th century and in Egypt specifically, from the 1830s onwards. For instance, more and more students were going to Europe, especially France and, once back, were telling their community about different ways of thinking about culture, law, everyday life and so on. This led to a new situation, which Albert Hourani refers to as “two spirits in one body”.
By the beginning of the 20th century, when Hassan al-Banna was a young, bewildered primary school teacher, he lived in a community in which parts were becoming more Europeanised, meaning that Egyptians would still consider themselves Muslims but would also adopt what they saw as modernity wholeheartedly. And for them, because both Islam and modernity were valuable, there could be no discrepancy between these two systems of meaning. On the other hand, there were the religious clerics, who became very anxious and intransigent because of these changes, attacking every thing about Western modernity. And this divide persists today in Egypt : you have the liberal Muslims who believe that Islam is in perfect accordance with liberalism, and you have people who strongly oppose any Western ideology.
The Muslim Brotherhood was created at this specific moment in Egyptian history and that is when the notion of “counter-hegemony” becomes relevant. The Brotherhood thought that the two camps were not going to resolve the matter, as it had become impossible for them to listen to each other. On the one hand, it was too late to try to roll back modernity through religious arguments, but on the other hand, they could not just give up to modern secularism. Consequently, they settled to infiltrate society, slowly but surely, aiming at winning people over back to Islamic culture, Islamic lifestyle, Islamic laws, one by one – they were inspired by the imagery of Noah’s ark, bringing as many survivors as possible.
This strategy carries Gramscian overtones : the Brotherhood hoped to counter what was quickly becoming common sense by slowly expanding their Society. Their hope was – and it came to a climax with Rabaa in 2013 – that after creating what Gramsci calls the “war of manoeuvre”, that is, winning over larger sections of society, then the “frontal attack” could take place. It was not necessarily seen as a violent clash but rather a confrontation between two different, parallel communities, culminating in the victory of the more committed. Hassan al-Banna, at the Fifth Annual congress in 1939, specifically told his fellow Brothers : you’re too hasty, you want to move prematurely ; only when we will have enough committed people, we could move to the frontal attack. That is why, I think, Gramsci is useful for understanding the Brotherhood. Of course the Muslim Brothers were not thinking in terms of Gramsci but in terms of the prophet’s tradition, starting with a small community and winning people one by one to finally overwhelm the unbelievers.
This moment of foundation of the Society still resonates with us now and it is important to understand that, throughout their history, the Muslim Brothers were always very consistent with their ideal of generating a cultural transformation.
In the 1930s they thought that the transformation might be achieved through fostering good relationships with the young reformist King and thus they became staunch monarchists. Then after the King turned against them, they took part in the Free Officers’ coup, thinking that, if they could help create a Republic, they would be able to infiltrate the subsequently established media and universal education system. And actually Sayyid Qutb, on the eve of joining the Brotherhood, was a cultural adviser to Nasser. Then Nasser turned against them. When Sadat got them out of prison, they reinvented themselves as supporters of a just dictatorship and embarked on cultural transformation by becoming his advisers. After years of collaboration, Sadat turned against them. When Mubarak came in, he did not want them as his advisers but allowed them to work in the sphere of civil society. Here, the more contemporary version of the Muslim Brotherhood took shape. Working at the level of civil society means, for the Muslim Brothers, running for elections at universities, syndicates, and parliament, with the aim of using the campaign itself as a cultural platform. The same logic applies to their charity work in neighbourhood mosques, nurseries, schools, and so on.
In sum, the Brotherhood’s strategies varied over time but their goal of cultural transformation remained the same. While Hassan al-Banna tried to win people over to a central Brotherhood headquarters, the current Brotherhood attempts to infiltrate civil spaces, without people necessarily being aware that they are Brothers. Contrary to the literature that usually portrays them as opportunists or pragmatists, they are utterly consistent in terms of objectives.

Moving toward more contemporary developments, can you broadly account for the popular uprising that led to Mubarak’s downfall, pointing out the specific role the Brotherhood played in this mobilization, especially its youth wing ?

The Muslim Brotherhood has been working within civil society since the seventies. But after thirty years, many young members of the Brotherhood became slightly impatient and got involved with more direct forms of political protest, such as the united front movements like Kefaya, Facebook pages such as “We are all Khaled Saeed”, or youth movements like the April 6th movement. They started exploring different avenues, which were more subversive and more confrontational.
However, on the eve of the uprising, it was no secret that the Muslim Brothers were sending clear messages to Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak’s son and designated successor, that they would not oppose his succession if he would allow them the same space and freedom within civil society. And so, when the revolt itself took place, the Muslim Brothers were taken aback, since it was out of their field of possibilities and expectations. Many of the youth who were disillusioned with the Brotherhood went on to form several small (and so far insignificant) parties, such as the Egyptian Current, and Strong Egypt, while the Brotherhood famously decided to join the uprising on the night of 28th, when it became obvious that a big change was taking place.
However, it is important to know that, on the 1st of February, the Brotherhood sent Mohammed Morsi, who became president afterwards, and Saad El-Katatni, who became first speaker of the parliament, to negotiate a deal with Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s intelligence officer. Through this settlement, they would try to explain to the demonstrators in Tahrir that things could be solved through negotiations, while in exchange the Brotherhood would be offered a political party and more space. But on the 2nd February, the day after the meeting, the battle of the so-called Battle of the Camel occurred, changing the situation.
As soon as the revolt ended, the Brotherhood went back to asking how they could create their cultural transformation. They looked around to see whom they could work with. On the one hand were the civil activists, this core group of men and women responsible for the revolt, mostly liberal, leftist, with a very strong secular agenda. They could work with the Brotherhood to uproot the old regime but they would not want to see the country Islamised. On the other hand were powerful institutions : the military and the security, which had been the Brotherhood’s enemies for some time but which were not promoting any cultural agenda. So the Brotherhood thought to convince them that they could replace the old ruling party (that has been dissolved and its leaders imprisoned), so the institutions could take the Brotherhood as their new political partner. The Brotherhood thought there would be no clash because the security and the military institutions would not care about what the Brothers are mostly concerned with : culture – in this regard, it is worth noticing that in the first Muslim Brotherhood government under Morsi, the three positions they were really adamant about were : Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Information and Ministry of Education. In return, the Brotherhood could help the security and the military stabilize the political situation and shield them from accountability.

You briefly mentioned the power triangle between the political, the military and the security, which you describe further in one of your books [3]. Can you develop this argument and explain how Morsi’s regime fit within this triangle structure ?

In my work, I try to look at what I refer to as the “power triangle,” the political, military, and security institutions that constitute the core of any ruling bloc. I study regime change through examining the interactions of these three institutions, which are of course embedded in a certain cultural, socio-economic and geopolitical context.
My analysis is that what began as a military dominated regime in the 1950s slowly metamorphosed into a police state, with the security becoming the most important institution on the eve of the 2011 revolt and the military remaining an important, but less privileged partner. Consequently, the military saw the 2011 revolt as a good opportunity to outmanoeuvre its ruling partners and to change the power configuration. They first got rid of the old ruling party and came face to face with the security. Their plan was then to create a new political partner that would not be so troublesome and would defer to the military. The military initially thought about the revolutionary activists and, interestingly, the first governments formed after the revolt included figures associated with the opposition. However, at the end of the day, the military realized that the revolutionary youth was just too destabilising for the country and their next option was the Muslim Brothers, who presented themselves as a good partner : “We know how to defer to powerful institutions, we are not as rash and reckless as these youth, we are organised and we will not cause you any trouble, our sphere of interest which is culture is not your field our interest, etc.”. They seemed like a very good fit.
But what the Muslim Brotherhood did not suspect in trying to fit within this power triangle was that paying respect to the military and the security would not be enough. Famously, the Muslim Brotherhood did not only support the supreme military council in most of its decisions, but also identified with almost all of the security positions : the importance of maintaining order, the discourse on foreign conspiracies, the blame on the revolutionaries for challenging the police, etc. When Morsi came to power, he immediately said that everything was forgiven and forgotten because the security has reformed itself and even right before he was overthrown he went on to declare that the security was a partner in the revolt.
Incidentally, the current interior minister recently said that Egyptians do not have a problem with the security, as illustrated by the fact that the revolution occurred on Police day out of respect – while it is obviously the opposite. Later people found out that this line of reasoning was Morsi’s idea : in one of his speeches, he said that it had been the will of God that the day of the Revolution and Police day coincided.
So, the Brotherhood thought that paying respect to the security and the military would be enough. The problem is that they did not account for the fact that the two political factions they intended to replace could actually unite against them. The revolutionary activists felt betrayed because of the Brotherhood’s attempt to hijack the revolution, while the old regime networks refused to share power when they could reclaim it all once more. And so during the summer 2013 an incredible tactical alliance between the old regime and the revolutionary activists took place, in order to bring down the Brotherhood.
It would be wrong to think that the uprising of the summer 2013 was completely manufactured. The military and the security blessed it, but there were also millions of people in the streets. The revolutionary activists succeeded in agitating against the Brotherhood on their websites and on television and gave legitimacy to the uprising, while the old regime used its own money, networks and bureaucracy to get people out. So, now, the Brotherhood is out of the picture and Egypt’s political institution is still in a state of flux.
People suggest that the military controls the regime but, in my analysis, when Sissi goes to the presidency and leaves the military, he is no longer the parole officer representing the military. He has his own position and legacy to take into account – how he will go down in history books. We have a two-headed regime with the military and the security as the strongest institutions and it is still unclear who is going to dominate. And you have fluidity in the political field. Sissi is trying to build his own camp around the presidency, a faction made of technocrats and advisers, who are not political in any way but who work in a managerial style to achieve his vision. Very much like Nasser, he is trying to turn politics into management. But he is worried because the old regime is trying to get back to power, primarily through parliament. Ahmed Ezz, once the mentor of Gamal Mubarak, tried to run for parliament and of course the “independent” judiciary prevented him from running due to a technicality. But even if he can’t enter parliament, he can still be the caucus leader from outside. Old regime clients and businessmen are planning to run as independents and dominate parliament. And so again the independent judiciary, days before parliament elections was due to start, postponed the elections, saying that the electoral law is not constitutional although constitutional lawyers were involved in drafting it. So Sissi is trying to buy time to solidify his camp, and others are really anxious to get to parliament to solidify their own networks as well. They might come together under the umbrella of one party, under the umbrella of a number of parties, in a coalition. The regime’s character is not yet clear. Military and security are anxiously looking at each other, the political seat is contests, so that it is difficult to predict where the country is going.
The analysis I am conducting here is more complicated and fragmented than mainstream analysis, which states that the Muslim Brotherhood tried to be part of the revolution but was ultimately overthrown in a counter-revolution.
[1Hazem Kandil, 2011, « Islamizing Egypt ? Testing the limits of Gramscian counterhegemonic strategies », Theory and Society, Vol. 40, No. 1., pp. 37-62.
[2Hazem Kandil, 2015, Inside the Brotherhood, Polity Press.
[3Hazem Kandil, 2012, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen. Egypt’s Road to Revolt, Verso Press.
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